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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: LINER AGENCY AGREEMENTS
Degree: MSc
The dissertation is a study of the principal-agent relationship, with reference to the
functions and provisions found in liner agency agreements, the current environment
under which liner agents are operating, and ways in which their status can be refined in
order to increase their bargaining power and maintain their existence.
A broad description of the general conditions and obligations contained in some liner
agency agreements is given and their implications analyzed, as an attempt to expose any
existing problems, uncertainties or omissions which may exist in relation to the
operation and interpretation of the provisions of the agreements.  The primary challenges
are perceived as increased liabilities, poor remuneration and the growing competition for
liner services within the shipping industry.  Existing means to cover the agents’
liabilities and attempts to seek better recognition by means of insurance options and
member associations are presented.  The closing chapter, offers several
recommendations for the way forward; greater awareness of the importance of the
agency role, improved dialogue between the principal and agent representative bodies,
and the diversification of cargo related services, are stressed as the means to ensure the
liner agents survival.
KEYWORDS: Agency agreements, Agency associations, Commission, Contract
liability, Liner agent, Service diversification
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Historical background
In the early days of sea trade, ship owners operating small vessels canvassed for
merchandise and loaded their cargo for export to various destinations in the world.  They
traveled on board their ships from port to port, where they sold their goods and
purchased more commodities for discharge at their next destination.  As trade became
larger in scale and more frequent in occurrence, ship owners increased their fleets and
began to employ trustworthy captains to undertake the voyages while they took care of
their interests ashore.  (Latarche, 1998).  Further developments between the late 19th
century and mid 20th centuries in world trade saw the discovery of new larger markets
and ports.  This led to the birth of liner shipping which was designed to offer regular
services to designated ports carrying whatever cargoes were ready on the sailing dates
(Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 2000).
In order to increase their market share and improve the efficiency of their ship
operations in foreign ports, ship owners began to appoint independent agents to
represent their interests at the regular ports of call.  Their duties included finding
markets for the master’s goods, cargo for export and providing crew in exchange for
commissions.  (Latarche, 1998).  History reveals that agreements entered between the
ship owners and agents comprised of simple letters and sometimes, verbal agreements
without the need for elaborate clauses, terms or conditions.  With time however,
increased transactions conducted at long distances saw the need for legally binding
contracts spelling out the duties and responsibilities of both principal and agent, as well
2as the terms and conditions of the agency agreement.  These came to be known as Liner
Agency Agreements.
1.2 Problem definition
The prevailing view in the agency industry is that there exists a grievous disparity in the
corresponding positions of the principal and agent in most parts of the world.  It has
been stressed that a growing imbalance with respect to the responsibilities and potential
liability in favor of the principals has continued to push agents into a vulnerable
position.
On a global level, a majority of the independent liner agencies are loosing their
traditional place in the market due to increased competition.  A present look at the liner
industry shows a prevalent inclination towards mergers, acquisitions, consolidations and
the opening up of principal owned agencies.  The shipping industry has also seen the
entrance of other players such as the freight forwarders and non-vessel operating
companies (NVOC's) take up an active role in offering ship and cargo related services
previously controlled by the liner agents.
The above events may be seen as inevitable market developments, which are not unique
only to the liner agent as a transport intermediary.  However, another area of concern to
the liner agency business has been the increasing demands, risks and liabilities being
laid upon them by local authorities, third party interests as well as their principals;
liabilities which essentially should be the concern of the principals.
The subject of the ship agent's remuneration has been another bone of contention.  The
continuous volatility and ever decreasing liner freight rates has had an adverse effect on
their commissions earnings, which are based on the freight amount generated through
cargo bookings.  Given the escalating costs associated with providing efficient services
3through the recruitment of qualified personnel and the application of up to date
information technology systems, it is hardly surprising that the agents are finding
themselves barely surviving.
1.3 Significance of the problem
Liner agents are appointed to provide a service to their principals upon entering into a
contractual relationship contained in the liner agency agreements.  As well as addressing
the functions of both parties, the agreements also carry the general terms and conditions
governing their relationship, which include among others, the terms of remuneration,
jurisdiction, termination and liability clauses.  The individual principals usually draft the
agreements and as such, they vary in content and weight.  It has been stated that the
majority of these tailor-made agreements are imbalanced in favor of the principals, and a
lot of criticism against the unfair circumstances has been raised by many concerned
parties, among them being the International Federation of National Associations of Ship
Agents and Brokers (FONASBA).
The liner agency business is no doubt an essential part of the shipping industry, which
has spurned for several centuries, and is bound to remain for many years to come.  Liner
agents have continued to offer a regional and global network of services to their
principals due to their expertise of the local market conditions, and the flexibility they
have to offer.  It is essential that both parties are placed in a fair position in order to
foster a working relationship that is beneficial to both of them.
1.4 Remedial action
Attempts to institute a component of uniformity and hopefully a better understanding of
the terms of the agreements by their users, led to the creation of the recommended
FONASBA Standard Liner Agency Agreement (FONASBA SLAA) in the early
nineties.  However, it appears that this document has not been widely accepted as
4illustrated by the following statement by Smith (1999 p.9), “Many of you will say that it
is impossible to use the FONASBA contract because most principals will regard it as
being heavily weighted in favor of the agent:”
In addition to the above efforts, shipping agents all over the world have organized
themselves into national and regional associations aimed at promoting their profession
and protecting their activities.  In this regard, various associations have adopted codes of
conduct, standard trading conditions and agency fee scales for application by their
members.
The insurance industry has also tailored insurance packages to offer liability insurance to
the agents to cover their risks.  Despite the steps taken to improve their status, agents are
still faced with a lot of pressure to survive.
1.5 Statement of purpose
Having recognized the vital role played by the liner agent as a transport intermediary,
the purpose of this dissertation is to carry out an analytical study of the prevailing
working conditions between the agents and their principals as contained in the liner
agency agreements, with a view to identifying any key areas that require improvement
and to offer possible solutions.
1.6 Scope and methodology
The study of the liner agency agreements will be carried out by analyzing certain clauses
found in a sample of tailor made agreements, which shall also be compared with those to
be found in the recommended FONASBA SLAA.
Nine samples were drawn from five regions, namely South America, North America,
Europe, Africa and Asia, as general representatives of the attitudes and expectations of
5liner principals located in these regions.  They have been re-named and slightly modified
so as not to disclose the contracting parties before attaching them to the dissertation as
annexes.
Chapter two will provide an account of the main functions and terms of agreement
commonly found in a majority of the agency agreements in use today.
Chapter three will give a detailed analysis of some of the clauses contained in a sample
of agreements, with a view to highlighting any problem areas that reflect any imbalances
and inadequacies.
In chapter four, the author will emphasize the challenges, common problems and
disputes faced by both the agent and principal, which may stem from the disproportion
of responsibilities in the agency agreements analyzed.  Possible solutions to these
problems will also be addressed.
Chapter five will look at ways in which liner agents have organized themselves to
protect the existence of their profession.  The work of some associations, insurance and
consultancy service providers will be presented.
Chapter six will provide a summary of findings and make some recommendations
geared towards resolving the problems discussed.
1.7 Limitations
The major difficulty encountered while conducting the study, was in obtaining the
sample agreements, as they are essentially, confidential documents.  Also, a greater
number of the agents contacted to give their views on the subject of the agency
agreements declined to give disclosed interviews or fill in questionnaires for fear of
6jeopardizing the existing relationships with their principals.  It is also worth mentioning
that the subject of agency agreements has not been given much attention in published
books.  Hence, much of the research was carried out by use of journals and internet
sources as reference material.
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A DESRIPTION OF LINER AGENCY AGREEMENTS
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will focus on the contents of liner agency agreements in general.  The
principal-agent relationship will be defined and the customary terms and conditions
governing agency agreements described.  The responsibilities of the liner agent vis a vis
the principal will be outlined as well.  The contents of agency agreements will be
discussed in line with the categorization given in the FONASBA SLAA (Annex 3).
2.2 Definitions
2.2.1 The "Principal"
In the context of shipping services, a "Principal" has been defined as:
"A company or firm or person who has or whose representatives have instructed
the Company (agent) and is the owner or charterer or manager of the vessel
represented by the Company (agent) and or the carrier under the bill of lading in
connection with which services are provided by the Company (agent)."  (Annex
11 p. 2)
2.2.2 The "Agent"
Lewis (1992, p.26), in discussing the role an agent defines him as a person who brings
his principal into contractual relationships with third parties.  He demonstrates this
relationship with the following illustration: -
8P
CONTRACT
A    3RD PARTIES
Within the context of this study, the "Liner Agent" is defined as the company of firm or
person, who has been appointed to act of behalf of the principal in performing all shore -
based technical, commercial and financial functions of ocean shipment on liner terms.
2.3 The agent’s authority
The authority given to the agent to act on behalf of the principal can be express or
limited depending on the agreement entered into.  Stevens & Butterfield refer to three
ways by which an agency can be created, namely: -
I. Agency by express authority – Whereby the agent acts per his principal’s
specific instructions to perform certain things on his behalf. The authority may
either be limited to conditions under which to operate, or may allow the agent to
act in all ways in furtherance to his principal’s business.
II. Implied Agency – An agent when faced with extraordinary circumstances or
perils in his usual course of business, may take actions, which he would have no
authority to do. For example, an agent who has express authority to take care of
the interest of his principal’s ship during a port call may order for emergency
repairs to a ship in order to avoid undue delays.
III. Agency by ratification – This occurs when an agent engages in an act for which
he has no authority whatsoever, but informs his principal after its occurrence and
the principal accepts or “ratifies” this action.  However, “a contract in excess of
authority can be ratified only when the original agent contracted as agent, though
in excess of authority.”  (1981, p. 122)
92.4 Types of liner agency agreements
2.4.1 Tailor-made agency agreements
According to the Merriam-Webster’s dictionary (2000), the term “tailor-made” means
something “made or fitted especially to a particular use or purpose.”  The expression
tailor-made, in the context of this discussion refers to those agreements that are prepared
by the specific liner principals to suit the requirements of the particular trade and scope
of the appointed agents’ duties.
Many tailor-made agreements may be similar in terms of purpose and general duties of
the parties involved, but an individual study and interpretation of each document is
likely to reveal remarkable differences in the balance between rights and obligations,
benefits, as well as liabilities.  They are also unique in terms of structure; some are short,
simple and straightforward in language, while others are ambiguous and notoriously
long even stretching up to 20 pages.  More often than not, these agreements are
principal-biased, and leave little potential for re-negotiation.  Smith, in Taking Action by
Agreement, remarks that the prevailing competition between liner agents has led to a
situation whereby some are ready to accept almost any terms that their principals may
offer them. (1998, p. 33)
2.4.2 FONASBA Standard Liner Agency Agreement (FONASBA SLAA)
As agencies grew in size and numbers and began to form associations, it was felt that
there was a need to come up with guidelines giving a balanced share of responsibilities
and duties to both parties.
In the late sixties, FONASBA issued the first version of the Standard Liner Agency
Agreement followed by a number of revisions in the early 90’s.  These did not receive
much support from the liner principals.  According to the BIMCO Bulletin, the reason
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behind this is that in general, liner companies prefer draw up their own terms of
agreements to suit their specific modes of operation.  (FONASBA liner agency
agreements, 1993.)
It was not until 1992 that FONASBA together with the ship owners association BIMCO
came up with another version, which was approved by the latter's documentary
committee in May 1993.  The document provides an exhaustive list of duties for the
parties involved.  In realizing that the various contracting parties may need to make
some additions or leave out any inapplicable clauses, this document is intended to serve
as a guideline on how to draft a balanced liner agency agreement.  (FONASBA liner
agency agreements, 1993)
The five page 4th edition FONASBA SLAA is available upon application from the
secretariat of the federation in London.
Regarding the adequacy of the FONASBA SLAA, Smith in Taking Action by Agreement
comments that,
Although the FONASBA liner agency agreement is a well drafted document, the
sponsors recognize that it is inevitable that amendments will be made in order to
reflect the circumstances of the parties to the agreement.  However, agents and
liner principals could do a lot worse than use the agreement as a working draft
during negotiation. (1998, p. 33)
2.5 A study of the provisions of liner agency agreements
2.5.1 General conditions
The bilateral relationship between the agent and principal must begin with an agreement
and in order for any contract to be binding, there must be an offer and acceptance.  The
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majority of appointments are by means of a written contract or letter of intent, are based
on a specified period of time and address the appointed area of work.  Most of the tailor
made agreements as well as the FONASBA SLAA provide insertions to enter the names
of parties to the contract, the date when it takes effect and the territory in which the
agent shall perform his duties.
2.5.1.1  Scope of work
Most liner agency agreements cover port and or inland territory work, which includes
marketing of the principal’s services, handling cargo, handling vessels including those
owned by the principal, chartered vessels or in the case of slot space charter agreement
with other carriers.
The FONASBA SLAA specifies that the performance of activities which fall outside the
scope of the agreement shall be addressed in accordance with the local general
conditions or established custom of the trade, and will be treated as part of the
agreement, “unless otherwise agreed”.  The duty to inform the principal of the existing
local general conditions, customs and practices lies with the agent who shall supply a
copy of the same to the principal if it exists.  (Annex 3, clause 2.04)
2.5.1.2  Other conditions
Most agreements contain distinct clauses governing the performance of the contract in
relation to the following subjects: -
(a) Conflict of interest: - The agent is expected not to represent other carriers in direct
competition with the principal, or to engage in freight forwarding or NVOC
activities.
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(b) Confidentiality: - All aspects of principal’s business are to be treated with strict
confidentiality.
2.5.2 Duties of the agent
In general, the agent's obligations as outlined in all agreements include, but are not
limited to the following: -
• To always obey instructions given by the principal and seek to exercise skill and care
in the performance of his duties.
• To abstain from delegating his duties to third parties unless authorized by principal.
• To recommend and or appoint sub-contractors for and on behalf of principal.
• To obtain the necessary licenses, permits and other required authorizations.
2.5.2.1  Marketing and sales
The agent's commercial functions include the duty to: -
• Market his principal’s services while maintaining contact with shippers, forwarders,
unimodal carriers and other related authorities.
• Quote and negotiate freight rates, as well as announce tariff announcements in
accordance with the principal's laid down tariffs.
• Canvass and book cargo in accordance with space allotments.
• Arrange for public relations work including advertising, the announcement of sailing
schedules and press releases.
• Provide regular sales market information such as cargo projections.
• Prepare the necessary shipping documentation on behalf of the carrier.  These
include bills of lading, booking notes, delivery orders, certificates, and cargo
manifests among others.
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2.5.2.2  Port agency
The technical function of the ship's agent is to protect the ships interests before her
arrival at port, during the vessel’s stay at port and following her departure. (Francou,
1999).  The agency agreements usually specify that the agent shall: -
• Attend to the vessel entry, clearance, berthing, performance and exit clearance.
• Ensure an efficient and proper performance of vessels through the supervision and
co-ordination of the activities of port authorities and other appointed sub-contractors.
• Make necessary arrangements for the safe loading and discharging of cargoes as well
as attend to transshipment cargo.
• Arrange for bunkers, repairs, husbandry, crew changes, ships stores, spare parts, cash
funds to vessels’ commands and other necessary provisions.
• Handle claims, Protection and Indemnity insurance matters, surveys and general
average matters as instructed.
• Update the principal on his vessels' performance and port working conditions.
• Handle the movement of full and empty equipment, ensuring the maintenance of an
efficient container control system.
• Arrange for stuffing and de-stuffing of LCL cargo within port area and the ICDs.
• Arrange for the proper storage of units as well as their maintenance and repairs.
2.5.2.3  Accounting and finance
The agent’s financial functions as expressed in agency agreements, typically include the
duty to:
• Prepare periodic financial statements.
• Check vouchers for services rendered, prepare proper disbursement accounts for all
vessels and advice of any amendments to local port tariffs and charges.
• Calculate freights and other charges in accordance with the principal's tariff
conditions.
14
• Collect freights and other monies owed to the principal and make remittance of the
collections at period intervals as per the principal's requirements.
• Advise the principal of existing customary credit terms and other arrangements in his
territory for his necessary authorization.
2.5.3 Duties of the principal
The principals' responsibilities as outlined in both the FONASBA SLAA and some tailor
made agreements are similar, and include the duty to: -
• Provide documents and stationary he specifically requires for use by the agent. These
normally include custom designed bills of lading, delivery orders etc.
• Give adequate information on scheduling, ports of call, tariffs, and policy decisions
that may affect the port and sales activities.
• Provide funds to cover disbursements, unless the agent has sufficient money from
freight collections.
• Indemnify the agent against all claims, charges, damages and expenses that he may
incur in connection with fulfillment of his duties under the agreement, during its
duration as long as acts leading to such damages are not by reason of his misconduct
or negligence.
 Indemnify and reimburse the agent for bonds, guarantees or securities to customs or
other statutory authorities in connection with cargo movements.
2.5.4 Remuneration
The agent is entitled to remuneration for the performance of his contractual duties,
which is payable in form of commission, agency fees or other payments, as outlined in
the fees and commissions schedule covering various services.  These are normally
broken down to cover: -
• Commission for export and import cargoes.
• Booking and container handling fees.
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• Ancillary charges collected by agent on behalf of the principal, such as demurrage.
• Fees for claims processing and settlement of other duties that the agent may be
called upon to perform.
It must be noted that the commission fee which is a percentage of the freight rate
applicable for export and import cargo as well as other lump sums and fees are
regulated, but negotiable and differ from agreement to agreement.
Additional conditions and costs payable by the principal differ from one agreement to
another, but generally comprise the following: -
• Terms of review to the fee structure.
• Currency variations.  The FONASBA SLAA takes into consideration the effects of
tariff and local currency variation exceeding 10% ( 5.04)
• The matter of any additional income collected by the agent in form of commissions
or rebates.  Some agreements require these to be credited to principal’s account.
• Part of the administration and communication costs incurred by the agent in the
course of his work payable on a monthly average amount, costs or lump sum basis.
• Agents’ travel and accommodation expenses for authorized travel.
2.5.5 Duration
Agency agreements may terminate either due to the lapse of the contract period as
agreed, by operation of the law or by the act of either party.  Termination of the contract
by either party is to be conveyed by registered/recorded mail.  A specific notice period
of between 3 to 6 months is required in most of the tailor made agreements.
The ensuing motives for untimely terminations that are common to a great number of the
agreements in use are the: -
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• Negligence or willful misconduct on the part of the agent.
• Suspension or withdrawal of the principal’s service to the agent’s territory.
Other reasons common to tailor made agreements but excluded in the FONASBA SLAA
include the: -
• Bankruptcy of the agent.
• Undue withholding of principal’s funds by the agent.
• An unfavorable political or economic climate in agent’s territory.
• A major change in management or control of the agency.
2.5.6 Jurisdiction
Arbitration is often a preferred means of settling disputes between the principal and
agent as a substitute for lengthy court procedures and costly litigation.  Typically, most
of the agreements include an arbitration clause.  The choice of the arbitration location is
often open to agreement between the parties, but more often than not, the principal
dictates the venue which is usually his place of domicile.  The FONASBA SLAA
nominates London, but allows the choice of an alternative venue.  (7.01)
2.6 Conclusion
Today there are hundreds of independent liner agents operating from many countries
where sea transport takes place.  While it is difficult to ascertain how many liner agency
contracts are based on the recommended FONASBA agreement, and how many are
tailor made, it will be beneficial to examine and identify the varying provisions
contained in the various agreements currently in force in the ensuing chapter.
17
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CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF SOME LINER AGENCY
AGREEMENTS CURRENTLY IN USE
3.1   Introduction
The agency relationship is created when one person or entity (the principal) assigns
another (the agent), to deal with third parties on his behalf.  The terms and conditions of
this relationship are embodied in the agency contract or agreement, which is legally
binding to both parties and is governed by the law of the agency (Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 2000)
The agency contracts in the liner trade, commonly known as liner agency agreements are
based on the above principle.  Although they generally define the terms and conditions
as well the duties of both parties, their contents vary according to the scope of work,
geographical area, and the comparative bargaining power of the two contracting parties.
(Smith, 1999).
This chapter will give a critical account of certain clauses, which may be seen to place
the agent in an unjust position in relation to the principal.  A total of ten agreements,
including the FONASBA SLAA, which are included in the appendices, will be studied.
They have been allocated titles such as the Asian or South American agreements, to
denote their origin without disclosing the individual parties to the agreement.
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3.2 General conditions
3.2.1 Conflict of interest clauses.
In fulfillment of his fiduciary duties to the principal, “the primary duties of the agent to
the principal are those of care, obedience and loyalty.  Specifically, he must act solely
for the interests of his principal and refrain from engaging in undisclosed interests
adverse to those of his principal.”  (Encyclopaedia Britannica online, 2000).
In common law countries, the principal is obliged to provide the agent with a regular
opportunity for service, and has a duty to assist and not to inhibit the agent’s fulfillment
of such a service.  (Encyclopaedia Britannica online, 2000).
It is not surprising to note that principals have been very prudent to include a clause
which forbids the agent from putting himself in a position which could jeopardize their
interests, especially in the prevailing competitive environment of liner shipping.  Clause
2.02 of the FONASBA SLAA, as well as the African agreement (Annex 1), require the
agent to abstain from representing other carriers or engaging in activities which are in
direct competition with the principal without his written approval, but also add that the
approval "shall not unreasonably be withheld.” (2.02).  Of this specific clause, Smith
(1999) observes that agents are content to accept such a provision, which according to
him seems reasonable.
Similarly, all tailor-made agreements carry a conflict of interest clause.  In the South
Asian (Annex 8, clause 2.2), and Indian (Annex 4, clause 32 c) agreements, the agent is
forbidden from representing other direct competitors or engaging in any business which
may be in direct conflict with the principal’s interests without his written approval.  The
Weser (Annex 9, clause 3.02) and North Continental (Annex 6, clause 3) agreements,
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however, apply the words "direct and indirect", whilst the North American (Annex 5)
adds in clause 9, that upon the termination of the agreement, the agent must not contact
or continue to deal with any customers acquired in the course of his representation.  Not
only does the application of the words “direct or indirect” in the above example put an
unreasonable demand on the agent, the principal does not give a counter clause
indicating his willingness to accommodate the agent’s interest with a similar
undertaking.
Of the agreements studied, only the FONASBA SLAA, the African and Asian
agreements include a fair provision, stating that the appointing principal undertakes not
to appoint any other party to perform services already defined in the agreement within
the agents territory.  Granted, it is not expected that all agreements will be based on the
requirements of common law, but the attempt to impose one sided demands as
demonstrated in some of the tailor-made agreements, creates an unfair situation to say
the least.
3.2.2 Delegation clauses
Lewis (1992), points out that the agent, having been appointed to carry out the agency
work himself has no authority to delegate his work to third parties, a duty often referred
to as “delegatus non potest delegare”.  The reason behind this position is that the
agency-principal relationship is not only a personal one, but is usually one that calls for
discretion.  He continues to say, “delegation of such authority will be a breach of the
confidence reposed in the agent except under the following cases: -
a. Where delegation was in contemplation of the parties at the
commencement of the agency.
b. Where the appointment of a sub-agent is necessary for the proper
execution of his work.
c. If delegation becomes necessary as a result of a sudden emergency.
d. Where delegation is sanctioned by trade, custom or usage.
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e. Where the work will not call for the exercise of any discretion by the sub-
agent.
f. Delegation is also possible where part of the work requires a special skill
and the agent does not have that skill  (1992, p. 12)
Regarding delegation, clauses 3.02 and 3.03 of the FONASBA SLAA as well as the
African agreement state, that the agent may in consultation with the principal
recommend and or appoint on the latter’s behalf and account sub-agents, stevedores,
watchmen, tallymen, terminal operators, and all kinds of suppliers if required.  Further,
according to clause 3.04, the agent is not to be held responsible for the sub-agents
negligent acts, unless he failed to exercise due care in the selection and appointment of
the sub-agent or sub-contractor.
In contrast, clause 2.8b of the South American agreement (Annex 7) stipulates that "the
agent shall indemnify and hold principal harmless against and from any and all damages
and claims arising out of the activities of such sub-agents (whether or not consented to
by principal)”.  The Weser agreement allows for delegation of the agent's duties subject
to the principal's approval, but also adds, “such agent, sub-agent or sub-contractor is
considered to be the agent’s servant.” (3.03)
The master-servant relationship defined in the above example is a clear indication that
the agent is to remain vicariously liable for the sub-agent’s tortious conduct committed
in the course of his employment, irrespective of any personal fault of the appointing
agent.
Various questions may arise from the above scenario:
i) Is the agent to await written confirmation from his principal even when faced
with emergency situations?
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ii) Does the typical agent possess the specialized skills and capacity to perform all
duties that are ordinarily subcontracted to 3rd parties such as terminal operations,
supplies and provisions, trucking etc?
iii) Do such strict instructions leave any room for the agent to exercise implied
authority and due care, or do they erode the trust bestowed upon him while
attending to the principal’s matters?
iv) What is the purpose that the principal would insist upon giving his written
approval for appointment of sub-agents and sub-contractors, if he is not willing
to share the blame for losses arising out of their mistakes?
In discussing this topic, Smith (1999) says that although it is not strange to come across
agreements permitting the agent to delegate his duties to sub-agents, in such cases, the
agent remains responsible for the acts of the sub-gents at all times.  Further, he rightfully
comments that, considering that these third parties are unknown to the principals, it is
only to be expected that they will insist on this particular requirement.
In principle, the express authority to delegate does not necessarily lead to privity of
contract between the principal and sub-agent.  However, where the principal has given
written approval, it seems logical that that he should bear part if not all the responsibility
for negligent acts or default of the sub-agents and sub-contracts as long as due care was
exercised by the agent whilst recommending and supervising them.  According to
Stevens & Butterfield (1991), in cases whereby the principal has firmly accepted the
appointment of a specific sub-agent, it could be said that a privity of contract has been
created between them.  The sub-agent could in effect be considered as an agent.
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3.3  Duties of the agent
3.3.1 Documentation
The charge to attend to all documentation matters on behalf of the principal rests with
the agent, and includes the issuance of bills of lading, delivery orders, certificates and
the preparation and lodging of cargo manifests.
Clause 4.26 of the Weser agreement requires the agent to issue bills of lading and other
documents as may be required.  The West European agreement in clause 3.1.14 (Annex
10) asserts that "unless otherwise specifically authorized by the Line in writing, the
agent shall under no circumstances release bills of lading otherwise than upon shipment
of export cargo".
What qualifies as reasonable is only a matter of opinion and furthermore, an agent could
effect instructions requiring him to issue documents under circumstances which may not
be viewed as legal or reasonable by a court of law such as claims from shippers and
consignees of undelivered cargo.  If it is of any comfort, the South Asian agreement
(4.4) offers indemnity to the agent for damages that he may suffer while following his
principal's instructions, provided they do not arise out of the agent's negligence.  (4.4)
Fortunately, some agreements specify that bills of lading may only be issued for loaded
cargoes and according to accepted trade practice. (South American, 2.3).  A good agent
may always refer to this clause when faced with uncertainty.  Likewise, the FONASBA
SLAA and African agreement in clause 3.05 assert that the agent will always strictly
observe the shipping laws and regulations in his country of operation.
3.3.2 Accounting and finance
Part of the agent’s accounting functions is the duty to settle, on behalf of the principal
any outstanding disbursements to suppliers, port authorities and other service providers,
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incurred on account of the principal's vessel operations.  Usually, the agent is
responsible for collecting and remitting freight and other surcharges due to the principal.
These two functions are addressed in different ways according to the individual
principal's policy.
The South Asian agreement carries a clause that should be of concern to any agent.  In
it, the agent accepts to advance for his principal all local expenses, following which he
shall be reimbursed after the principal has received and approved his monthly statement
(7.4).  In the ensuing clause, the agent accepts to pay his principal a delinquency penalty
at the rate of 10% for the overcharge on the disbursement accounts or short collection on
revenue accounts.  The said penalty amount is not reversible even after a corrective
advice is issued, without the principal’s written consent and at his own discretion.
The Weser agreement (4.44), stipulates that freight collections are to be remitted as per
the principal's instructions.  The following clause has been inserted: -
Pay in case of delayed remittance/payment to the principal, interest at the rate of
3% above the discount rate of the Deutsche Bundesbank valid the freight and
other monies have been due until the date of delayed remittance/payment.
In the above example, the agent is not directly authorized to retain money even for the
performance of his principal’s financial obligations, yet it imposes a penalty for delayed
remittance.  It is therefore astonishing to note that yet another clause requires the agent
to pay disbursements to sub-contractors not later than six weeks following each vessel’s
departure, as long as funds are available. (4.47).
It is disturbing to note the prerequisites of some of the examples discussed above.  While
the agent is not clearly authorized to retain funds to cover the principal’s debts, no
commitment is given by the principal to advance him the required funds on a timely
basis.  Further, the South Asian agreement, while imposing a penalty for incorrect
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statements, fails to address the matter of paying interest to an agent who uses his own
funds for the benefit of the principal.
It is worth saying that there are some reasonably drafted agreements such as the African
agreement and FONASBA SLAA, which authorize the agent to utilize funds from
freights collected as long as the principal is kept informed of his cash position on a
regular basis. (3.40).  The North Continental agreement requires the agent to collect and
credit freight collections into the principal's account 30 days after vessels sail, after
making deductions for commissions and expenses. (4b).
3.3.2.1    Credit terms
In a bid to secure business support from shippers, agents and ship owners often consider
offering credit terms to shippers, in the context of issuing "freight pre-paid" bills of
lading, where freight has not been collected.  Where the creditor settles the outstanding
freight within the stipulated credit period, everyone concerned will be content.  (Smith,
1999).  The critical question then becomes who between the agent or principal is
expected to take up the responsibility of pursuing payment or bearing the consequential
loss in case of defaults on payments.
It would be useful to examine the agent’s position in relation to the principal, in a case
whereby a creditor fails to settle the amounts due to the ship owner under the following
scenarios;
i) When the agent is required to obtain express authority to grant credit.
The FONASBA SLAA in clause 3.45 provides that: -
If the agent is required to grant credit to customers due to commercial reasons,
the risk in respect of outstanding collections is for principal’s account unless the
agent has granted credit without the knowledge and prior consent of his
principal.
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The African agreement (3.45), which is as good as a duplicate of the FONASBA SLAA
at this point, is altered in favor of the principal to read that, "The risk of outstanding
collections is for the agent's account and the agent will exercise due diligence."
Likewise, in the Weser and West European agreements, the agent is expected to obtain
his principal’s authorization before granting credit to shippers.  The responsibility and
consequences for any unpaid freight remain solely with the agent.  (4.45 and 4.13).  It
seems that these two agreements give an unfair status to the agent; even though the
principal expects to be the sole decision-maker as to when credit may be applied; he also
attempts to exonerate himself in pursuing a creditor who has failed to meet his
obligation!
ii) When an agent who is not authorized to offer credit but undertakes the risk.
The responsibility to collect the freight from the shipper lies with the agent.  Smith
(1998) refers to this as a “del credere” agent, who offers a guarantee in exchange for a
special extra commission.  The North American agreement in clause 8 reads that the
decision to grant credit is entirely up to the agent, who shall remain responsible for the
collection of outstanding debts as well as any consequences arising thereof.
iii) When there are no distinct instructions to the agent whether or not he is
authorized to grant credit.
The Indian and Asian agreements make no specific provision on the subject of credit
terms and conditions altogether, hence the agent is not clear of his legal position on the
matter.
From a strict legal point of view, an agent who acts without express instructions laid out
in the agreement is in breach of the agency contract.  Smith (1999 p. 7), points out that
such an agent may argue that credit terms are part of the customary trade practices in his
territory, and that his position as agent warrants him the authority to do what is required
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to obtain cargo.  Stevens and Butterfield (1981, p. 122), further suggest that the agent
has implied powers bestowed upon him, to do everything necessary for the performance
of any expressed authority he may have received from the principal
With this in mind, it may be considered reasonable for the agent to allow credit in order
to canvass for cargo bookings on his principal’s services.  However, in order not to
create uncertainty and adverse consequences for both parties in case of default, there is a
need to ensure that the matter of credit is well defined within the agreement.
3.4 Indemnity clauses
3.4.1 Agent’s indemnity
Certain clauses found in almost all tailor-made agreements hold the agent liable for all
losses incurred by the principal resulting from acts, omissions, default, mistakes, errors
or negligence of the agent or his servants.  Clause 28 of the Indian agreement, for
example, maintains that the agent shall indemnify and hold the principal harmless, from
all claims, penalties, suits, losses, costs and expenses resulting from partial or full
default of the agent in performing his duties.  The South American agreement (7),
requires the agent to indemnify the principal for fines, civil penalties, delay to any
vessels, and damage to cargo resulting from his negligence in supervising stevedores and
terminal operators.
The issue of when the agent or his employees may be said to have acted in a negligent
manner may be difficult to resolve.  Smith, while discussing the subject of principal
biased agency agreements cites an onerous clause, that required an agent who disclaims
responsibility for losses or damages, to bear the burden of proof. He properly concludes
that this clause is too burdensome on the agent, as it reverses the burden of proof that is
normally required.
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According to the FONASBA SLAA, the agent is to “indemnify the principal for any
fines, penalties, expenses or restrictions that may arise” owing to agent’s failure to
adhere to shipping laws and regulations of the country. (3.05).
3.4.2 Principal’s indemnity
The indemnity provision found in clause 4.04 of the FONASBA SLAA and African
agreement provides that the principal, shall indemnify the agent against any claims,
losses or expenses which may arise from the negligent acts of the sub-agent or sub-
contractor, as long as the agent excercised care in their selection and appointment: -
A careful examination of the principal’s duties found in the Weser agreement reveals a
clause worded exactly as the one found in the FONASBA SLAA as shown above. (5.05).
The Asian and North Continental agreements do not carry any indemnity clauses.
It must be noted that unlike the indemnity clauses found in the sample of agreements, it
is only in the FONASBA SLAA and African agreements where the agent and principal
stand in a reasonably fair position.  This argument could be taken further to include the
doctrine of respondeat superior, by maintaining that the principal and agent stand in a
master-servant relationship, hence the master must always be held vicariously liable for
the servant’s tortious conduct committed within the course of his employment.  Under
this principle, the master’s vicarious liability extends in some instances, even to claims
arising from the servant’s intentional torts.  (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2000).
3.5 Remuneration
The agent’s remuneration in form of commission is payable as a percentage of the
freights charged and collected.  The percentage applicable is subject to negotiation
between the two parties, although the rate ranges between 2 and 5 %.
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The remuneration schedule of the FONASBA SLAA gives a remuneration breakdown
for export cargo, import cargo, fees for booking only, container handling and ancillary
charges collected by the agent on behalf of the principal such as demurrage.
Further, in order to share some excessive administration and communication costs
incurred by the agent in the course of his work, the principal undertakes to pay the actual
or part of the expenses based on average costs or on lump sum basis.  All agents’ travel
and accommodation expenses for authorized travel shall be covered in full by the
principal.
Separate fees for claims processing and settlement undertaken by the agent when
required by his principal shall be remunerated separately.  Likewise, other duties that the
agent may be called upon to carry out shall be remunerated based on the express
understanding between the two parties.
Clause 5.01 holds that any fees expressed in monetary units in the attached schedule will
be subject to review every 12 months and adjusted in accordance with the recognized
cost of living index as is published in the country of the agent.
Clause 5.04 provides that should currency variations between the tariff and local
currencies exceed 10%, then the calculation of remuneration shall be adjusted in
accordance with any currency adjustment factor existing in the trade.
The tailor made agreements on the other hand, address the question of remuneration in a
narrow and inadequate manner by simply referring to attached rate schedules showing
the remuneration rates.  A few examples on the levels of commissions and other fees
have been compiled as follows: -
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1.  Asian (Appendix I) 2.  West European (Clause 5)
Description Rate Description Rate
Outward cargo 5% gross frt. Outward cargo 5% nett frt.
Transshipment cargo - Transshipment cargo -
Inward cargo 5% gross frt. Inward cargo 2.5% nett frt.
Handling fee/box $ 15/box Handling fee/box US 20/box
Equipment control $ 10/box Equipment control US 10/box
Other expenses/provisions Other expenses/provisions
Shipping documents e.g. bills of lading Advertising costs at agent's account.
on account of principal.
3. Weser (Addendum A) 4.  North Continental (Clause 0.1 - 0.6)
Description Rate Description Rate
Outward cargo 5% nett frt. Outward cargo 5% gross frt.
Inward cargo - Inward cargo 3.25% gross frt.
Crossbookings 2.5% nett frt. Collection fee 5%
Other expenses/provisions Other expenses/provisions
Documents and stationery to be provided Advertising costs on principal's account.
by principal.  Advertising on principal's
account.
5.  South Asian (Appendix 1) 6.  Indian (Page 15)
Description Rate Description Rate
Outward cargo 5% nett frt. Outward cargo 5%
Transshipment cargo $ 25/full box Transshipment cargo $ 15/box
Inward cargo 2.5% nett frt. Inward cargo 2%
THC collection fee 2% Freight collection fee 0.50%
Equipment control $ 10/full box Equipment control $ 14/box
Other expenses/provisions Other expenses/provisions
Travel and accommodation,
international communication,
Not specified
courier and advertising costs on
account of the principal.
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In a balanced contract, the rights of the agent should impose corresponding duties on the
principal.  Likewise, duties of the agent should give corresponding rights to the
principal.  Lewis (1992, p. 13), summarizes the basic rights of the agent as follows:
i) Right of re-imbursement for reasonable expenses incurred by him in the course
of performing his duties.
ii) Set-off.  Should the principal bring an action against him for breach of contract,
the agent should be able to exercise his right of set-off for any sums due to him
in form of commission or indemnity expenses.
iii) Lien.  Subject to certain conditions, the agent should be in a position to exercise
a lien on the principal’s goods in his possession in case the principal has failed to
pay his commission or indemnity costs as agreed, until the matter is settled.
iv) Action for agreed commission or remuneration.  Upon the performance of his
duties, the agent is entitled to receive his full commission.
In the tailor-made agreements discussed, there is no mention of additional fees for
services such as collection of demurrage, nor reference to rate reviews in case of
increased costs or inflation.  Further, no provision in the tailor-made agreements gives
the agent the right to exercise a lien on the principal's assets should the latter fail to settle
the agent's dues.
3.6 Duration and notice period
Like any other contracts in use in other business practices, the agency agreement can
terminate by either party giving the other a written notice as stipulated in the agreement.
Following are some examples: -
Agreement Duration Notice period
i) Indian indefinite 180 days
ii) North American indefinite 60 days
iii) African indefinite 3 months
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The shortest notice period of 3 months may work against the agent who has invested a
lot of resources in the agency infrastructure, and worse still if he only represents one
principal.
3.7 Termination for breach of the agreement
Termination of the agreement by either party, prior to the expiry of the notice period
could occur under various circumstances, for instance: -
i) The withdrawal or cancellation of ship owner’s services for economic
reasons, or due to a change of company policy or for other reasons
beyond either party’s control.
ii) Due to the willful misconduct on the part of the agent.
All agreements analyzed contain some of the above and other circumstances that could
lead to immediate termination as well as the consequences for such an action.  The
FONASBA SLAA addresses this matter in great detail:
1)  Clause 6.02 holds that,
If the agreement for any reason other than negligence or willful misconduct of
the agent should be cancelled at an earlier date than on the expiry of the notice
given under clause 1.01 hereof, the principal shall compensate the agent. The
compensation payable to the agent shall be determined in accordance with clause
6.04 below.
2)  In a case whereby the principal withdraws or suspends the service for any reason, the
agent may also opt to withdraw from the agreement “without any prejudice to its claims
for compensation” (6.03)
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3)  According to clause 6.04, the latest version of the general conditions or national law
on termination of agency contracts shall apply.  The clause proceeds to give a basis of
compensation where such statuary law or conditions do not exist as: -
A monthly average of commission and fees earned during the previous 12
months or if less than 12 months have passed then a reasonable estimate of the
same, multiplied by the number of months from the date of cancellation until the
contract would have terminated in accordance with clause 1.01.
4).  In addition to the above provisions, the principal undertakes to take into account the
gross redundancy payments due to the agent’s employees as a result of the premature
cancellation of the agreement.
Finally, clause 6.05 of the FONASBA SLAA states that the agent has a general lien on
amounts due to the principal in case of any undisputed sums due to the agent, which may
remain unsettled following a cancellation of the agreement, provided of course the
termination was not due to his willful misconduct.
No doubt, the above provisions give the agent adequate protection ensuring that he is not
left standing on the road when the principal suddenly decides to pull out of their
relationship.
It is now worth looking into how principal biased tailor-made agreements, as they are
often called, treat this subject.
Clause 7.02 (a – f) of the Weser agreement provides that the principal has the liberty to
terminate the agreement, “without prejudice to all other legal rights and remedies to
which the principal may be entitled in relation to the termination of this agreement”,
under the following circumstances: -
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1) If the agent is declared bankrupt; asks for a moratorium or has engaged in special
arrangements with his creditors.
2) In case of any form of action taken by any government or public authority in the
agent’s country.
3) Failure on the agent’s part to remit principal’s monies within 30 days following the
principal’s written demand notice, unless the agent can prove the situation was due
to an error.
4) In case of a major change in the agency ownership or control, or even a change in
personnel handling part or all of the principal’s matters.
5) If the agent commits any act or omission be it intentional or not, which constitutes a
major breach of the contract.
6) Failure on the agent’s part to remedy any breach of the contract, which has been
brought to his attention within a period of 30 days.
On the matter of compensation, clause 7.05 of the same agreement reads that
"notwithstanding any local statute or national law to the contrary the agent will refrain
from claiming any indemnity or compensation or the like if this agreement for any
reason should be terminated."  A similar provision is found in the Indian agreement
(33), whereby the agent is not entitled to any compensation in form of goodwill,
investment in agency infrastructure, or whatever title may deem fit, save for earned
commissions.
The above listed reasons are not only too stringent, but they also leave room for various
interpretations with regard to what might constitute a major breach or what may be
termed as unfavorable conditions of operation in the agent’s country, warranting the
withdrawal or cancellation of services.  To add insult to injury, a preceding clause 7.03
of the Weser agreement requires a terminated agent to continue performing the duty of
collecting and remitting outstanding freights and other dues until such power is revoked.
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There is no mention of how the agent will be remunerated within a contract that no
longer exists!
A fundamental flaw in these kind of imbalanced agreements is that they omit the agent’s
rights to terminate the relationship if the principal is faced with any of the stated
circumstances.  No doubt, an agent who accepts the inclusion of such provisions in the
agreement, needs to obtain a sizeable professional insurance cover and hope that all
things remain constant so as not to suffer the arduous effects following his principal’s
decision to pull out of the agreement.
3.8 Jurisdiction and arbitration
The place of arbitration is of utmost importance to both parties to the agreement, as the
applicable laws determine the outcome of disputes especially those pertaining to the
protection of money.
English law governs the FONASBA SLAA, so any arising disputes are to be referred to
London for arbitration. Each party may appoint one arbitrator within 24 days, failing
which the decision of one arbitrator shall apply.  Should both parties agree to appoint an
umpire, his decision is to be considered as final.  Alternatively, disputes may be referred
to another place as agreed, and shall be subject to the laws and procedures of that land.
If the alternative clause is not filled in, it shall be taken to mean that the conditions
stipulated in clause 7A shall apply.
The South American agreement, in clause 17.00 indicates that disputes shall be referred
to New York for arbitration, while the North American agreement nominates Houston,
USA as the arbitration venue.  The Weser Agreement is to be governed and construed in
accordance with the laws of Germany, and only allows arbitration to be conducted in
accordance with the German Maritime Arbitration Association.  (9.00, 10.00).
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Considering that agents are based and operate from all parts of the world, the limitation
of the laws governing the agreement to the principal’s base as in the case of the Weser
and American documents, creates unfair circumstances.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter has determined that tailor-made agreements carry differing demands but in
general, almost all the clauses analyzed apportion onerous conditions to the liner agent.
The consequences arising out of the use of these agreements create obstacles and could
lead to difficulties, which will be discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
THE LINER AGENTS’ MARKET PLACE: Common problems and challenges
4.1 Introduction
A recent survey carried out by the Ships Agent and Broker magazine enquired how
principals viewed their agents.
One of the respondents was quoted saying; “Everything depends on the agent. But it is
not our task to teach them how to do their job if they do their job badly.”  (Ship agents
market place, 1998 p. 90.).
Other industry critics may hold a different point of view:
Ship agents are soft targets. Reputable principals will insist that they don’t dump
on their agents, and most of them don’t.  But there isn’t a shipowner borne who
hasn’t at some time or other been tempted to leave the agent to carry the can
when something goes wrong.  (Soft targets, 1998, p. 5)
This chapter will highlight the working environment of the liner agents, their challenges
and common problems encountered, seek to establish the possible reasons behind these
problems and suggest ways to overcome them.
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4.2 Duties of the agent
4.2.1 Marketing and sales
Bureaucracy - In their day to day role of canvassing for cargo to fill in their allocated
space, agents often experience a common problem of bureaucracy while dealing with
their principals, such as the unwillingness on the part of the principal to match market
rates and other customer requirements.  Sometimes, principals are notorious at rejecting
canvassed cargoes for a whole range of reasons, just as long as they have met their
overall loading capacities on the round leg.
One such example cited by ITIC (What price steel? 1997, p. 3), describes a case
whereby, a German Liner Agent undertook to load 10,000 Mt. of steel from Hamburg to
China in three separate loads of 5,000, 2,000 and 3,000 tons.
The agent had put forward details of the booking to the line, and believed that the
line had agreed to carry all 10,000 tons at the same rate and therefore confirmed
the booking to the shipper.  The first 5,000 tons were carried without problem,
but the line refused to carry the second and third parcels at the same rate due to a
rise in the market.  Unfortunately, the lines telex did not make it clear whether
the line had accepted the first 5,000 tons at the rate quoted, or whether the rate
applied to the full 10,000 tons.
In the above example, the liner company loaded the balance of the consignment at a
higher freight rate with the freight difference being settled by the agent.
Port call cancellations - Liner operators have been known to divert their vessels from
the regular routing.  In some instances, they allow some scheduled ports to exceed their
allocated slots for commercial reasons; it may be that the preferred cargo will fetch a
higher freight.  This results in a reduced allocation for another agent in the next port of
call, who had canvassed enough bookings to fill his allocation as previously advised.
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An agent faced with such a situation not only looses part of his expected income but is
left to deal with the shippers who may not be interested in giving more business in the
future.  Often, agents are forced to roll over the shut out cargo to the next vessel call
without informing their clients.
A consequence of this action could be claims for the late delivery of cargo.  The
principal’s stand would probably be that the agent should have complied with the
instructions to reduce his bookings, despite having been instructed whilst cargo was
already at port awaiting the vessel’s arrival!
Unrealistic targets – No doubt the agent and principal share the same goal, to maximize
cargo-booking capacity in order to increase their earnings.  Does the principal always
consult carefully with the agent on the needs of the market before positioning larger
vessels, increasing slot allocations and increasing the frequency of calls?  Such decisions
made by the principal or consortia without involving the market intelligence of the local
agent may lead to increased pressure and could result in the former loosing his
representation on grounds of lack of performance.
4.2.1.1  The principal’s perspective
At this point, it would be useful to identify some of the problems experienced by
principals in their dealings with their agents, as reported by the Ships Agent and Broker
(Ship agents market place, 1998, pp. 91-95)
Agent’s lack of commitment - It has been said that sometimes, the independent agent is
not too keen on following his principal’s instructions on cargo types and rates to be
applied, and is sometimes seen to be more loyal to the local clients than his own
principal.  (Ship agents market place, 1998, p.93).
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Inaccurate market information -  "In general, agents are not prepared to provide
shipowners' with statistical data regarding the local market" was the response from one
principal, Alianca.  (1998, p.93).  Do agents sometimes offer misleading and poorly
researched market analysis, which yield no fruit in the end?
Poor communication - Important matters are not reported to the principal on time. And
lousy local marketing can ruin a principal's business", as reported by National Shipping
Company of Saudi Arabia.  (1998, p.93)
Unfavorable local conditions -More often than not, the liner operators are forced to
cancel ports of call or divert cargo due to circumstances beyond their control.
Congestion and unfavorable port and inland transport conditions leave them with no
choice but to suspend the service until the conditions improve.  Other times, the operator
has to take a decision to divert his attention to other more productive and profitable
territories.
4.2.2 Documentation
Sound shipping practice demands that cargo should only be released to the rightful
owner or consignee against the presentation of the original bill of lading.  Studies carried
out by the International Transport Intermediaries Club reveal that the leading cause of
claims against liner and port agents happens to be the delivery of cargo without bills of
lading.  (Ten golden rules for the delivery of cargo, 1997 p. 1).
As regards the issuance of bills of lading for export purposes, sound-shipping practice
again requires that the agent issue a correct bill of lading indicating the correct cargo
quantities and circumstances of the shipment, including the actual date of loading.  In
some instances, carriers and agents offer pre-dated or post-dated and “clean” bills of
lading to shippers for cargo not actually loaded, or for damaged cargo in exchange for
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letters of indemnity issued by the receiving parties.  The reasons for such actions are
commonly given as: -
i) The need to comply with the requirements of a letter of credit.
ii) In the case of expired export licenses or import quotas.
All the agency agreements analyzed in this study show that agents are expected to
comply with their principal’s instructions at all times, within reason.  Agents, are
however, misguided in believing that as long as they are acting upon the instructions of
their principals by issuing incorrect documents against letters of indemnity, they are not
personally liable for fraudulent behavior.
A case of 1998 between the Standard Chartered Bank versus Pakistan National Shipping
Line and its agent Seaways Maritime, London, demonstrates that even though most
agency agreements require the agent to comply with his principal’s instructions, he is by
no means immune from the legal consequences of his actions.
The agent in the given example acted upon his principal’s instructions to issue and pre-
date a bill of lading by six weeks to the shipper for a cargo of bitumen from Bandar
Abbas to Vietnam. The high court judge, Justice Cresswell in his ruling awarded to the
bank damages estimated at $ 1.2m with interest.  He is quoted as saying that “Antedated
and false bills of lading are a cancer in international trade.”  In rendering his judgement,
Justice Cresswell did not distinguish between the degree of liability of the shipper, the
carrier and the carrier’s agent and ordered each party to bear one third of the loss.”
(ITIC, 1999, p. 35).
The latest developments in this case are that the court of appeal, presided over by Lord
Justice Ward dismissed an appeal lodged recently by the defendant’s, in a bid to have
the Standard Chartered Bank share part of their loss.  (Pearson, 2000).
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4.2.3 Accounting and finance.
4.2.3.1 Credit
Proper shipping practice requires that freight be collected in advance in order to reduce
the risk of debt.  There are exceptions to this rule when: -
a) Agents issue “freight pre-paid” bills of lading prior to collection of the freight,
thus offering credit to the shipper.
b) Agents issue “freight-collect” bills of lading, leaving the duty to collect the
outstanding amount with the agent at the port of destination upon delivery of the
cargo.
The previous chapter revealed that some agreements allow the agent to grant credit to
customers with prior authorization from his principal.  Where approval was granted, any
risks relating to uncollected freights will be on the principal's account.  Under the same
subject, the positions of a “del credere” agent, one who has express authority to grant
credit and another who has no distinct instructions whether or not he is authorized to
grant credit were examined.  As long as the agent adheres to the strict instructions given
to him, he is unlikely to suffer any consequences in case of default; it is, however,
important for him to secure his principal’s authorization in writing.
Agents have run into financial and legal difficulties upon giving credit without
authorization, and found themselves settling the freight owed to the carriers while
pursuing legal channels to recover the same.
Smith (1999, p. 8), while discussing the agents’ liabilities illustrates the above by
referring to a case called Cho Yang Shipping (liner company) versus Coral (UK) Ltd.
(shipper) involving the shipment of 20 containers of sugar from two German ports to
Dubai.  The entire transaction involved a chain of intermediaries.  The liner company,
EOS issued a “freight pre-paid” bill of lading before collecting the freight from an
intermediary named Interport Speditions, who had, in fact collected the total freight
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from the shipper’s forwarders, Nortrop.  The Court of Appeal ruled that the shipper was
not obligated to settle freight to the carrier, as he had entered into a contract with his
forwarders only, and not with Cho Yang Ming.  The bill of lading issued was viewed
only as evidence of the contract between the shipper and the carrier and not as a contract
in itself.
In his analysis of this case, Smith infers the agents EOS to be the losers especially if
their agreement with Cho Yang obliged them to take responsibility for the outstanding
freight, whether they collected it or not. He points out that as is common practice, the
principal had probably sued the shipper against the agent’s undertaking to conduct and
pay for the cost of litigation.
Liner agents who are willing to take the risk of collecting unpaid freights need to
investigate the financial position of their shipper, as well as obtain security from them in
form of guarantees or letters of undertaking which can be used in litigation (Smith,
1999).  It would also be prudent to consult with their principals and other agents at the
receiving port to ensure that invoices for “freight-collect” bills of lading are honored by
consignees, especially where large amounts of freight are concerned.
4.2.3.2  Debts and disbursements
Port agency services which form a large part of the liner agent’s operational duties,
include the payment of port dues such as towage, pilotage and handling fees.  Among
other services arranged for by the agents are stevedoring, tallying, supplies of bunkers,
spare parts, ships supplies and provisions.  The agent is expected to settle the costs of the
husbandry services from the disbursements advanced by his principal.
The matter of disbursement accounts is addressed in various ways in the sample
agreements studied.  The Weser document in clause 18 says that the agent shall submit
to the principal shortly before the vessel’s departure, a proforma disbursement account
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showing estimated costs, following which the principal shall make the funds available to
him, either in full or in part.  The agent is not permitted to withhold any freight collected
save for his earned commission.  The FONASBA SLAA under clause 3.46 allows the
agent to retain freight collected in order to cover past or present disbursements.
Experience shows that principals do not always live up to their promises to remit funds
in advance or in good time in order to allow the agent to settle port due and other
disbursements on time.  Titchener (2000 p. 41), the secretary-general of the Multiport
Ship Agencies Network, writes that agents are put under pressure to settle their
principal's debts from their own pockets.  This could lead to a financial catastrophe if the
agent allows the debt situation to get out of control.
Agents faced with such a problem may have no choice but to have their principals’
vessels arrested.  Nevertheless, Pitts-Tucker (1999), a shipping lawyer holds that most
agents are not willing to take legal action against their principals in a bid to preserve
their goodwill.  ITIC, advises its members to always get advance funds, and discontinue
to act if unpaid disbursements are rising. (Ten hints on avoiding bad debts, 1998,
August)
4.3 Agent’s remuneration
Liner companies have no choice but to demand efficient and up to date operational
services from their agents in the areas of information technology, as well as adequate
and properly trained staff in all their service areas so as to preserve their positions in the
competitive industry.  As such, they expect their appointed agents to invest in and
maintain these requirements.  Indeed, one agency agreement concerned about its image
demands that the agent maintain proper offices in building of good standing at his own
expense (Weser Agreement (5)).  Considering the agents' escalating operational and
maintenance expenses, one might expect that they would be remunerated fairly and on a
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timely basis so as to cover the cost of the services rendered and still keep a modest
profit.
The matter of agency remuneration has been discussed in the press and conferences, and
is viewed in various ways by industry experts.
i) Titchener (2000 p. 41), laments that agents are barely surviving.  Liner
companies are looking to reducing the agency charges as a way to keep their
costs to a minimum.
ii) For agents in Singapore, exchange rate losses due to the decline in the US dollar
against the Singapore dollar are seen to have affected the agents' revenue, since
no currency adjustment factor is applied to their agency commission.  (Singapore
agents battle for independence, 1995, p. 19)
iii) A recent survey by the Ships Agent & Broker magazine sought to find out what
the principals’ expectations of their agents were, and what they were actually
getting.  When asked if price was a factor when it came to choosing who to work
with, 63 per cent of them said that the issue was not of their highest
contemplation as long as they received a quality service.  A representative of
DSR Senator Lines was quoted as saying, "Price is of secondary importance. If
you squeeze agents too much, they’d go elsewhere.”  (Ship agents' market place,
p. 97).  Perhaps this should be taken as a good sign for liner agents to go forth
and renegotiate higher commission scales.
This issue has sparked off a series of debates for possible supplements to the
conventional provisions of the agency agreements.  During the recently held 4th Annual
Ship Agency Conference which took place in London on April 2000, the effects of lower
freight rates on the liner agents’ income were among the points that were highlighted.
One of the presenters pointed out that rates have been on a downward trend for the last
10-12 years.  Deregulation and anti-trust legislation in America and Europe, has led to
increased competition among the principal carriers, and weakened the conference
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systems that had traditionally kept the rates stable.  These developments have seen the
liner agent’s traditional income which is based on the freight revenue reduced by huge
margins. (Papavassiliou, 2000).
Earlier, during the Liner and Tramp Agency Committee Meeting held in October 1999,
in Sintra, Portugal, the remuneration framework of the working committee had pointed
out that a majority of the existing agreements, including the FONASBA SLAA do not
provide for a minimum figure or scale payable to the agent.  This situation, coupled with
the fluctuating income levels that agents have received over the past several years, has
forced many of them to engage in other income generating services open to them.  To
some, these activities which typically include NVOC, inland haulage and freight
forwarding services, may be in conflict of interest with the principal’s expectations, as
seen in many of the agency agreements analyzed in this study.  It is apparent that agents
and the principals likewise, need to come up with innovative and workable solutions to
this problem.
The participants in Portugal came up with some of the following proposals on how to
possibly supplement the agency agreements: -
i) Propose for a minimum rate per container/ton/cbm and include a lumpsum fee
per vessel call, plus what would be a lower commission level.  (Chairman)
ii) Include an additional “box fee” for administration.  (Belgium)
iii) Draw up a cost-based analysis for negotiating a fair mark up.  (Netherlands)
(FONASBA, 1999).
4.4 Negotiating terms of agreement
When the time to re-negotiate renewal of agency agreements comes, sometimes the
agent has found it difficult to obtain more favorable terms from his principal.
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Smith (1999, p. 4), writes that agents are prepared to accept almost any terms offered by
principals in order to get new business, and that the latter sometimes ensure a quick deal
is closed by giving tight deadlines.  He gives an example of an agent who received a
revised draft agency agreement comprising 20 closely typed pages from his principal.
The latter demanded a confirmation of acceptance within 7 days, failing which the agent
would be deemed to have accepted the new terms and conditions.
4.5 Jurisdiction and arbitration
Tailor-made agreements are usually governed by and construed in accordance with the
laws of the principal’s country of residence or operation, hence making no room for the
application of any other laws.
It can prove to be very difficult and expensive for small agents to challenge the large
ship owners in their own grounds or distant places.  Unfortunately, some agents do not
pay enough attention to this clause while on the negotiating level, hence fail to demand
the inclusion of favorable options or neutral locations of countries whose laws they have
knowledge of.
4.6 THE LINER AGENT’S LIABILITIES
4.6.1 The agent and his principal
The previous chapter discussed the indemnity clauses often found in the liner agency
agreements, which require the agent to indemnify the principal for losses arising out of
the negligence and willful misconduct of his employees.  Agents are bound to make
mistakes in the course of their work, especially in the area of documentation.  ITIC lists
some common mistakes made by agents, which could prove very costly;
 Misdirection of cargo – containers sent to Tripoli in Libya instead of Tripoli in
Lebanon.
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 Bill of lading drafting errors – freight marked prepaid instead of collect, or failure to
clause on-deck cargo.
 Reefer temperature problems – set to +20 degrees instead of –20.
 Manifest errors – weight shown in kilograms instead of pounds. Resulting customs
fines.
 Incorrect freight quotations – quote for Bilbao in Spain instead of Balboa in Panama.
Freight owed to Line will be claimed from agent.
 Mistaken release of cargo – wrong person, incorrect documents – ship owner’s
insurance will fail.  (Shipping Agency, 1999 p. 2).
A costly example given by ITIC (1999), involved an agent in Antwerp, who booked a
cargo of 63 containers to Blantyre but erroneously, quoted a rate for Bloemfontein.  The
shipper accepted the rate, and the freight difference amounting to USD 250,000 was
claimed from the agent by the shipping line.
The examples are many and as one would expect, the principal cannot possibly accept to
absorb such massive losses.  They have become intolerant to a point of some including
onerous clauses, which demand that agents prove that negligence was not on their part
for losses, or claims that may arise.  In Singapore, principals have introduced an
unofficial internal benchmark of 2% as the acceptable level for minor errors.  (Singapore
agents battle for independence, 1995, p. 19).
Agents are therefore advised to obtain professional indemnity insurance to cover their
liabilities as and when they arise.
4.6.2 The liner agent and third parties
More and more, agents find themselves taking the blame for the debts and liabilities of
their disclosed principals from various parties in the course of their duties, as illustrated
in the following circumstances.
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4.6.2.1  The agent and cargo interests
The agent who issues a bill of lading as “agent only” acting on behalf of the carrier is
not a party to the contract of carriage.  He should, therefore, be able to claim immunity
in case of cargo losses, damage or late delivery, as long as such losses did not occur due
to his negligence or misconduct.
Agidee (1999, p. 30), a Nigerian based lawyer, writes that the introduction of the
Admiralty Jurisdiction Decree into Nigerian law in 1991, makes it possible for the agent
to be held personally liable, even if he is acting for a disclosed principal.
(3) “A person who acts as an agent of the owner, charterer, manager or operator
of a ship may be held liable irrespective of the liability of his principal for the
act, default or commission of the ship in respect of anything done or failed to be
done in Nigeria.”
(4) “A person who does anything or carries out any duty under the provisions of
this Decree, or under the provisions of any law in force in Nigeria, shall by doing
that thing or carrying out that duty constitute himself the agent of that ship.”
4.6.2.2  The agent and port authorities
While undertaking his duties as port agent, the liner agent is usually responsible for
settling port charges on behalf of the principal, but should he be held liable for debts or
obligations of a disclosed principal?  And should his principal's ships cause
environmental damage or damage to installations whilst maneuvering in the port areas,
should the agent be held liable?  The answer is clearly no, but in practice, the agent is
often held liable.
Gonzalez-Lebrero (1997, pp. 211-212), indicates that in some countries, agents are held
jointly liable for the settlement of dues and costs of damage to port installations,
although of course, in a fair world, only vessel owners should be held responsible.
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In Spain, the 1992 Ports and Merchant Shipping Act holds the ship’s agent jointly liable
with his principal for settlement of port charges, sanctions and tariffs related to the ship.
In the UK, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore,
Thailand and Colombia to name a few, agents have been faced with claims from the
local authorities and the situation gets worse when their principals have gone bankrupt.
(Soft targets, 1998, p. 5).
Elsewhere, in the USA marine terminal operators have included a provision in their
tariffs holding agents responsible for their principal’s debts.  (Conflicting practice,
1995).  Agents have become accessible targets due to their local presence, and the
situation is aggravated by the fact that agents are small compared to their strong
corporate counterparts.
4.6.2.3  The agent and customs authorities
In some countries, the agent is held liable by customs authorities for duties and fines.  In
Turkey for example, in the event of shortlanded cargo, the agent is liable for a penalty
fee equivalent to the tax amount of the cargo.  In the event of overlanded cargo, the
agent could be sentenced to 6 months in jail as reported in the minutes of the liner and
tramp agency committee meeting, Sintra, Portugal.  (FONASBA, 1999, p. 13).
4.6.2.4  The agent and immigration authorities
Arising detention and removal expenses for stowaways, or passengers left ashore should
be borne by the principals, as the agent is not concerned with the contract of
employment with ships' crew.  He should not be held liable for any misconduct of
seamen either.  Yet, often the agent will find himself being held personally liable in such
instances by the immigration officials in his territory.
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 One clear example was in Spain where an agent was fined Ptsa 30m when stowaways
escaped from his principal’s ship in Barcelona.  (Faulty thinking, 1998, p. 3).
Having said the above, let it be noted that the liabilities suffered by agents are
sometimes as a result of their own negligence in the way that they depict themselves to
third parties.  An agent must be aware, that signing off a contract without clearly
indicating its agency status risks to be considered as having contracted on its behalf.
(Signing off, 1999, p. 1).
In order to avoid the above from happening, ITIC gives proper guidelines to the agents
on how to represent themselves in their dealings with customers, suppliers of services
and other involved parties.
• Sign off all documents “as agent only for and on behalf of XYZ Shipping Company”
• If invoices are received in your name, send them back and have them re-issued in the
name of the principal.
• If you are a liner agent, send out a letter every six months to the suppliers of goods
and services to your principals, informing them of your agency status. (Signing off,
1999).
4.7 THE LINER AGENT AND COMPETITION
The need for the principal to protect his business interests by the inclusion of a conflict
of interest clause was discussed in the previous chapter.  In particular, the agent is
expected not to represent other liner companies in direct competition with his principal,
or to engage in freight forwarding or NVOC activities in his territory.  Save for the
FONASBA SLAA and African and Asian agreements, other agreements do not offer the
agent any protection from suffering competition in case his principal appoints another
agent within his territory.
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Recent developments in the shipping industry have shown that gone are the days when
liner agents enjoyed the full business support from their principals.  Titchener (2000,
April, p. 39), in his discussion on competition writes that the agent is left with a
declining share of an increasing market.
There is no shortage of cargoes, nor any suggestion of a fall-off in world trade.
There is however a decline in the level of agency utilization as a result of
competition from principals’ owned agencies and from other non-specialist
service providers.
The reasons given for setting up carrier-owned agency offices are cost-cutting policies,
the changing patterns in service requirements, the need to establish standardization in
customer service, financial and computer operating systems.  Also, increased cargo
volumes in some regions like Asia justify the establishment of in-house agencies or
branch offices.
The industry has also seen mergers and consolidations of liner companies, which have
led to the loss of business for some agencies, whilst these lines re-organize their out-
sourced activities.  In Brazil and Argentina for example, the largest liner agencies have
lost business due to the consolidation of trades between South America, Europe and
USA, and according to Stares, the regional consolidation process is not over yet.
(Stares, 2000).  Further, immense progress in the field of information technology with
the increasing use of electronic data interchange (EDI) and internet in shipping business
transactions, has been viewed as another threat to the traditional role of the liner agent.
Agents are also at the mercy of local regulation, as demonstrated in Singapore’s
government initiatives to attract shipping lines to Singapore, which inevitably creates
stiff competition for the existing independent agents.  The 1991 Approved International
Shipping Enterprise (AIS) scheme, entitles renowned international shipping companies
with world wide networks to a full tax exemption on income originating from operating
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vessels in international waters outside of Singapore.  (Singapore agents battle for
independence 1995, p.19)
The situation has meant that, being an independent agent has become a very risky
business.  The liner agent, it seems has been left with no choice but to diversify into
other areas such as freight forwarding, cargo consolidation and logistics services in order
to survive.  As principals expand their trade routes and services, and agents also expand
their service to principals, it is inevitable that a conflict of interest may arise. However,
Johnson (1996), a UK based liner agent turned NVOC takes a different point of view
and points out that the matter of conflict of interest no longer deserves the attention it
has received in the past, and encourages agents to actively get involved in offering
NVOC activities.
It may be argued that agents are still capable of representing their principals adequately
while diversifying into other areas, but as long as the conflict of interest clauses
contained in agency agreements hold, they may find themselves facing charges or being
squeezed out of business altogether.
4.8   Conclusion
The independent liner agent’s problems are two fold; to overcome the internal
challenges of having to fulfil his obligations to his principal and secondly to deal with
the changing trade patterns of the liner industry.  The external pressures may be
overcome if the agents are willing to adapt to the needs of the industry, and take
measures to avoid their costly mistakes through training their staff, and taking up
liability insurance cover.  The internal issues between agents and their principals are
better dealt with by cultivating into more transparent and trustworthy relationships with
their principals, especially via their member associations, which shall be discussed in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER V
THE ROLE OF ASSOCIATIONS AND INTERMEDIARIES
5.1 Introduction
The pressure and challenges of the shipping industry facing the liner agents has
necessitated the formation of member associations and other advisory organizations, in
order to call for collective bargaining and a better representation of their interests.
This chapter will look at the objectives, work and achievements of some of these
international, national and private organizations.  As many of the national associations
exist in various continents around the globe, it is not possible to examine each one of
them within the context of this subject.  As such, only a selected number will be
introduced as a representation of the on-going efforts to preserve the existence of the
liner agency industry.
5.2 INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AGENTS ASSOCIATIONS
5.2.1 Federation of National Associations of Ship Brokers and Agents
(FONASBA)
The federation, which is based in London, the United Kingdom, is an international body
set up to deliberate and to voice with authority all matters related to the shipping
profession in so far as ship brokers and agents are concerned.  It has a present
membership of 50 national associations of ship brokers and agents spread all over the
five continents of the world.
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5.2.1.1   Aims and objectives
 To maintain an organization sufficiently extensive and reputable to justify co-
operation with other national and/or international bodies, authorities, associations
and organizations involved in matters of concern to the shipping profession.
 To promote a fair and equitable practice in the profession of ship brokers and agents
and to that end:
• to support its members whenever the basic and general interests of their
professions are concerned,
• to co-ordinate common efforts designed to improve, modernize, simplify and/or
standardize shipping contracts and documents and in so doing to safeguard the
traditional role of the ship broker and agent as intermediary and adviser to both
ship and merchant interest,
• to initiate such conferences, meetings, lectures and the like, as may be required
for the discussion of professional affairs, interests and duties;
to engage in such activities as may from time to time, in the opinion of the
Council, contribute to the interests of its members. (FONASBA, 2000)
The organization comprises of four working committees namely:
1) The Executive Committee
2) The Liner and Tramp Agency Committee
3) The Chartering and Documentary Committee
4) The Membership Committee
(FONASBA, 2000 b.)
5.2.1.2   Documents and publications
Some of the documents and publications of specific interest to the liner agent include;
1) FONASBA Standard Liner Agency Agreement (revised and adopted in July 1993).
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The agreement provides a guideline to both the principal and liner agent in
negotiating and drafting the terms and conditions governing their business
relationship.  The document has been recommended for use by BIMCO, a private
shipping organization which was primarily set up to safeguard the interests of the
ship owners.
2) FONASBA Sub-Agency Agreement, which is useful to liner agents and their
appointed sub-agents.
3) The Ship Agent & Brokers magazine, a quarterly publication that reports on news
and events in the shipping industry.
4) Press releases: - The federation recently issued a press release calling for more
clarity in the ship agents’ rate structures.  The president was quoted as saying,
The relationship between the principal and ship agent is one built on trust.  It is
important for that trust that principals understand clearly how they are being
charged and what the fees cover.  It will benefit both sides if it is transparent
what the true costs of the service are.  (FONASBA, 2000 a.).
5.2.1.3  FONASBA code of conduct
In order for the agency industry to be successful in meeting its obligations, it is
important to first obtain the regard and trust of the shipping industry participants and the
public at large.  The federation's code of conduct sets forth the professional standards
and guiding principles expected of its members.  The code states that members will at all
times: -
 act in accordance with all national laws and regulations of the countries in
which they operate,
 adhere strictly to the principles of honesty and integrity,
 operate in a sound and honorable financial manner,
 ensure that all principals' business being handled is dealt with in confidence,
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 cooperate with and contribute to the efforts of the appropriate authorities to
combat maritime fraud, agree to complete, wherever possible memoranda of
understanding with national customs and other appropriate authorities, so as
to assist in the halting of illegal trade in banned drugs.  (FONASBA news,
1998, p. 11)
5.2.1.4  Draft FONASBA standard port agency conditions
The conditions apply to all member companies engaged in port agency and are designed
to protect the agents against unfair liabilities and trading conditions with other industry
participants.  The final clause contained therein states that incase of conflict between the
conditions and any other agreed terms between the two parties; the conditions shall
prevail unless the agent openly agrees otherwise in writing.  (FONASBA news, 1998)
5.3 NATIONAL SHIPPING AGENTS’ ASSOCIATIONS
5.3.1 Cyprus Shipping Association (CSA)
The Cyprus Shipping Association  (CSA) was established in 1945 and registered in 1954
under the provisions of the local Trade Unions Law.  It is the official organization
representing the profession of the shipping agents in Cyprus, and has a total membership
of 46 agents.  (CSA, 1999).
5.3.1.1   CSA standard trading conditions
CSA recently implemented a set of Standard Trading Conditions to be used by its
members.  They resemble the conditions promulgated by the Institute of Chartered
Shipbrokers in order to match them with the existing local and international business
ethics and practices.  (FONASBA news, 1998)
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The set of conditions outline the terms and conditions applicable to business transactions
entered into by the liner and port agents with their partners. (Annex  11). They have
been categorized into three groups namely:
 Transactions with the Supplier.
 Transactions with the Merchant.
 Transactions with the Principal.
In general, they state that the liner agent or port agent shall at all times act for and on
behalf of all the above parties, and has no authority to enter into transactions as agents
unless otherwise stated in writing.  The agent, is therefore, not to be held personally
liable for any debts owed while acting for or on behalf these parties.
5.3.1.1.1   Agent’s liability
The Conditions also address the matter of the agent’s liability.  “The Company (agent)
shall perform its duties with a reasonable degree of care, diligence, skill and judgement.
(clause 20).  The Company shall be relieved of liability for any loss or damage if and
when the damage is caused by:
(a) Strike, lockout, stoppage or restraint of labour, the consequences of which
the company is unable to avoid by exercise of reasonable diligence.
(b) Any cause or event which the Company is unable to avoid and the
consequences whereof the Company is unable to prevent by the exercise of
reasonable diligence. (21)
5.3.1.1.2   Agent’s limitation of liability
Clause 22 limits the agent’s liability to the merchant up to a maximum of CY pounds
30,000 unless otherwise agreed in writing.  However, it further states that the liability to
the merchant shall in all situations be limited to the lowest amount, and provides for the
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manner in which the amounts payable shall be calculated in sub-sections (a) and (b) of
the same item.
5.3.1.1.3   Agent’s remuneration
The final section of the CSA Standard Trading Conditions addresses the subjects of
remuneration, liens, indemnity and jurisdiction.
In case of failure to honor payments due to the agent by the principal or merchant as per
their written agreement,  “the Company shall be entitled to recover interest on any sums
outstanding at the rate of 9% or such higher or other rate that may from time to time be
prescribed by the laws of Cyprus.”  (24).  Further, the agent shall have a general lien on
the principal’s and merchant’s goods in its possession and may sell them at the latter’s
cost to recover any sums due to him. (25).
5.3.1.1.4   Indemnity
The matter of indemnifying the principal, shippers and suppliers of goods and services
for losses and damages arising from the errors and omissions by the agent’s directors
and employees is covered under clause 26, which states that,
The principal, merchant or supplier undertake not to subject the company’s
directors, officers or employees to any claims or allegations for any loss or
damage or delay of whatsoever kind arising or resulting directly or indirectly
from any negligent act error or omission of the beneficiaries in the performance
of the services the subject of these conditions.
5.3.1.1.5   Other agreements
The concluding clause 31 of the CSA Standard Trading Conditions states that the terms
and conditions contained therein shall prevail unless the company "specifically agrees
otherwise in writing."
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5.3.2 Singapore National Shipping Association (SNSA)
The association is among the agents who have issued the recommended minimum scales
for vessels employed in regular liner trades with effect from 1st June 1995.  The rates are
subject to negotiation for the performance of additional work.  (BIMCO Agency Tariffs,
1998 p. 243)
5.3.2.1   SNSA recommended fee scales
The tariff is quoted in Singapore dollars (SGD) per gross freight, which includes the
application of all surcharges, may be summarized as follows: -
Agency fees and other charges
 a) Husbanding fee for cargo operations per vessel SGD  2,000.00
 b) Consortium co-ordination services (per container) SGD       10.00
 c) Attending to General Average declaration (per vessel) SGD  2,000.00
Cargo commissions and fees
1) General and liquid cargo 
a) Inward cargo 3 % of gross freight
b) Outward cargo 6 % of gross freight
2) Freighted containers
a) Inward 3% of gross freight
b) Outward 6% of gross freight
3) Minimum cargo commission per vessel call SGD 1,500.00
4) Container management fee/TEU (inward and outward) SGD      20.00
5) Transshipment commission 2% of through freight
6) Nominated export cargo 4.5% of gross freight
7) Freight collection commission 1.5% of freight
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5.3.2.2   General conditions
1) Principals should credit the agent with sufficient funds at least 3 days before the each
vessel’s arrival, failing which the agent shall have authority to retain the required
disbursement estimates from money collected from freight.  The agent is also at will
to levy a 2% surcharge on outstanding total disbursements and agency fees, and
charge an additional interest at the prevailing bank accounts interest rate if 30 days
lapse without him receiving his payment.
2) Any disputes arising between the agent and principal shall be resolved according to
the law of Singapore.
3) In case of agency termination, notice shall be given in conformity with the
legislation of the agent's country or a minimum of 6 months notice shall apply.  The
principal shall indemnify the agent for any arising consequences following the
termination of his activities.
5.4 INSURANCE, LEGAL AND CONSULTANCY SERVICES
5.4.1 The International Transport Intermediaries Club Limited (ITIC).
ITIC, a mutual insurance company located in London, the United Kingdom was started
75 years ago with the aim of providing professional indemnity and liability insurance to
the transport industry.
The services offered by ITIC include the following: -
 Professional indemnity insurance
 Liability insurance
 Commission income insurance
 Cargo liability insurance
 Debt collection services.
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In addition, the club offers direct advisory services to its members in order to help them
cope with the challenges they face in their day to day operations.  ITIC is also active in
producing regular publications and circulars on various subjects to educate ship agents
on some of the ways to reduce their risks and exposure to claims.
These are contained in the in-house Claims Review and The Intermediary publications
such as: -
1) Ten golden rules for the delivery of cargo.
2) Issuance of bills of lading.
3) Signing off - When acting for and on behalf of principals in order to avoid liability
claims from suppliers and other service providers.
4) Ten hints on avoiding bad debts.
5.4.2 Paul Smith Associates
PS Associates is a London based company involved in offering legal and consultancy
services to the transport industry.
The company is a member and associate of several professional associations such as
FONASBA, BIMCO and the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and provides specialist
consultancy services and direct representation in the following areas: -
 Insurance
 Loss prevention
 Contract negotiation
 Claims handling
 Debt recovery
 Arbitration and alternative dispute resolution
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5.5 Conclusion
In summary, both international and national associations of agents have taken
remarkable steps towards bargaining for better terms and conditions for their members.
In addition to FONASBA's attempts to regulate the agency agreements and improve the
agents’ performance standards, CSA and SNSA have taken measures to demand better
terms in the contentious areas of remuneration, indemnity and agents’ liability,
jurisdiction and termination.  It is the hope of the author that these associations have
managed to have the established trading conditions and remuneration scales
implemented in practice.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The study examined the contents of some liner agency agreements in use, with the aim
to ascertain if there were existing imbalanced liner agency agreements that require
improvement.  The analysis was geared towards establishing any correlation between the
common liabilities and problems faced by liner agents, and the so-called use of
"principal-biased" agreements.  The attempts to protect the ship agents’ interests via the
formation of agents’ associations and through the insurance channels were illustrated.
The following is a summary of the main findings of the study, as well some alternative
solutions to the main problems associated with the liner agency agreements and the
agents’ working environment in general.
6.1 The current challenges on liner agency agreements
1) The requirements of tailor made agreements: - Principal biased agreements certainly
exist and contain some contentious clauses that require consideration, mainly: -
I. Indemnity clauses
II. Termination for breach clauses
III. Terms of remuneration
IV. Jurisdiction and arbitration
V. Conflict of interest
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The above imparities play a role in some of the detrimental circumstances that agents
have often found themselves in as explained in chapter four, e.g. liability for their
principals' debts.  However, it must be emphasized that not all the agreements analyzed
make onerous demands upon the agent.  The North Continental and Asian agreements,
for instance, seem like relatively acceptable documents which have not applied much
effort towards apportioning liabilities to the agent in the so called indemnity clauses.
The specification of the two agreements must not be taken to mean that principals from
these regions are more impartial than others.  They are only used to represent the
author's view that some principals are fair and flexible when it comes to laying out their
terms of service.
2) The FONASBA Standard Liner Agency Agreement: - The study shows that the
contents of the FONASBA SLAA have not proved very popular with the principals.
This is demonstrated by the omission of the compensation terms (clauses 6.02 - 6.03) in
case of agency termination by the principal, from the African agreement which, save for
these alterations, is a replica of the FONASBA SLAA.
6.1.1 Possible solutions
I. It has been seen that some tailor-made agreements offer fair and flexible terms to
both parties.  This should be a sign to agents out there that they have to stop
accepting the imposition of burdensome clauses from their principals, and
continue to negotiate for balanced agreements.
II. If the agents are incapable of demanding agreements based on this draft, it is
time to return to the drawing table to redraft another version.  One that is not
only more palatable to the principals, but one that also takes into account the
changing service requirements and the evolving role of the liner agent today.
III. The efforts of certain ships agents’ associations have made some commendable
progress towards improving the agents legal status as demonstrated in the
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adoption of the CSA Standard Trading Conditions.  What remains to be done is
to ensure the integration of these efforts into the legal framework of the various
national regulations.  It is unfortunate that the legal systems in many of the
countries where agents operate do not recognize the ship agents' status; hence the
implementation of fair conditions may be a difficult task to achieve at this time.
IV. Perhaps the best solution would be for liner agents to elevate their position in
relation to the principal from one of master-servant to one of partnership.  This
move from the traditional agency status and the eradication of the liner agency
agreements may prove more beneficial and less troublesome for both parties.
6.2 Competition
It is expected that increased competition for liner agency representation resulting from
mergers, acquisitions, consolidations, the setting up of in-house agencies, as well as the
entry of new participants in the liner industry will continue to impact negatively on the
survival of the independent liner agencies.  What can the regular liner agent do to ensure
his continuance?  There are several ways forward, some of which the zealous agents,
especially those located Europe and North America, have already taken up
6.2.1 Possible solutions to counter competition
I. Agency consolidation: - Smaller liner agents could benefit from operating joint
back office operations while maintaining separate sales channels for their
respective principals.  Not only can they achieve size and improve their
professionalism, but this kind of arrangement would also enable them to spread
their overhead costs.  As opposed to competing amongst themselves for a
diminishing market, they can attain greater bargaining power when negotiating
contracts with their principals.  Joint ventures would give the smaller agents the
flexibility to offer principals the required service at an acceptable cost, therefore
reducing the need for principals to open their own agencies.
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II. Service diversification as opposed to specialization: -Today, importers and
exporters of cargo in most parts of the world are demanding door to door
services plus a range of logistics services which include cargo consolidation,
warehousing, packaging, inland haulage, forwarding and shipping.  Already,
some liner operators and freight forwarding companies have moved towards
offering supply chain management to their customers.  Liner agents must not lag
behind in what seems to be a growing and lucrative market; they must participate
in either one of the following ways by: -
a) Extending their services as agents to include the representation of NVO's, or;
b) Becoming NVO's by their own right.  Johnson, chairman of Johnson Stevens
Agencies Limited (UK), a former liner agency now operating as NVO,
describes their move as having been very successful.  Their example portrays
how a liner agent has managed to take over the freight previously controlled
by the former principal who became bankrupt.  (2000 April, pp. 46 - 48)
The advantages for an established liner agent to undertake NVO services while
operating under a Multi-modal Transport Operator or freight forwarders certificate are
that he already has the financial capability, expertise of the local operating climate,
qualified staff and, most importantly, close relations with the existing customers.
The role of marketing and documentation would essentially remain the same, though the
agents would no longer be responsible for port agency services.  They would however
need to take up insurance policies to cover their liabilities to cargo interests, just like the
carriers, as well as extend their networks with other companies to cover their operations
in their international service areas.  In their dealings with the vessel owners, the NVO's
utilize the shipping line containers and buy slots from a choice of shipping lines at pre-
determined costs.
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Their large volumes would enable them to negotiate favorable rates from their former
principals.  In addition, as opposed to collecting freight on behalf of the principal and
remitting the whole amount less their commission, as NVO’s they can bank all freight
and negotiate credit terms while earning additional income on interest.
6.3 Liner agents’ liability
The results of the study show that more and more, the liner agent is having to deal with
liabilities and claims from cargo interests, port authorities, suppliers of goods and
services.  It is also evident that liner agents sometimes have themselves to blame for
their woes.  The examples given in chapter four illustrate that frequent and indeed costly
errors occur mainly in the documentation process.
6.3.1 Solutions
The following precautions must be applied simultaneously:-
I. Training of personnel on how to avoid common mistakes.
II. Mistakes cannot be eradicated altogether.  Agents must therefore obtain
insurance to cover unforeseen liabilities.
III. Avoid getting into burdensome agreements.
6.4 Closing remarks
Several possible solutions to counter the problems faced by liner agents today have been
suggested.  The best solutions can only be achieved with attempts to create a more
amicable working environment, and in turn contribute in providing the required services
to the liner shipping industry.  It is the author’s conviction that efforts must be applied at
all levels, namely: -
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On a global level
FONASBA, must continue to lobby for a forum of discussion between themselves and
the ship owner's representatives (BIMCO) especially on the issue of remuneration.  The
federation has already received a proposal requesting agents to assist in carrying out a
cost-based analysis by providing their individual cost structures.  The federation needs to
make a follow up, and based on the results of the analysis, use it as justification for
principals to pay agents a fair mark-up to these determined costs.  It is necessary for
FONASBA to come up with minimum guidelines for calculating and applying the
proposed mark up rates for use by its members.
On a national level
It was beyond the scope of this study to establish the existence of national associations
for agents and to analyze all their achievements.  The attempts of two associations,
namely the Cyprus Shipping Association and Singapore National Shipping Association
to protect their members' interests were described in chapter five.  It is to the advantage
of liner agents all over the world to affiliate themselves with their local associations.
National associations must also lobby with their relevant government authorities to put
into place legal systems that give the agent a recognized status and legal protection.
On the agency level
The sentiments expressed by some liner operators indicate a sense of mistrust and
dissatisfaction with regard to the level of the efficiency of their independent agents,
especially in the areas of communication, sales and client service. What the agents need
to do is to apply concerted efforts within their own in-house set ups in order to deliver
the required services to their principals, as well as reevaluate their strategies in line with
the rapidly changing global trends of the transport industry.
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ANNEX 11
CYPRUS SHIPPING ASSOCIATION (CSA)
STANDARD TRADING CONDITIONS
FEBRUARY 1998
All transactions entered into by a Member of the Cyprus Shipping; Association
(hereinafter "the Company") in connection with or arising out of the Company's business
as a port agent or liner agent or booking agent or cargo handling agent shall be subject to
the following terms and conditions unless otherwise agreed or stated by the; Company in
writing.
1. In these conditions the following expressions have the following meanings:
(a) "Supplier" means the company firm or person, organisation or other competent
Authority, who contracts through, the Company to supply services or goods to the
Principal or Merchant
Å r
(b) "Merchant" means the company firm or person who ships, receives, owns or
forwards goods in respect of which the Company, whether as agent or principal, has
agreed to provide or procure services.
(c) "Principal" means the company firm or person who has or whose representatives
have instructed the Company and is the owner or charterer or manager of the vessel
represented by the Company and/or the carrier under the bill of lading in connection with
which services are provided by the Company.
(d) "Forwarding Services" means those services usually provided or arranged by
a freight forwarder including the carriage, of goods to the port of loading and from
the port of discharge, the storage, packing or consolidation of goods and the stuffing
and stripping of containers.
(e) "Cargo Handling Services" means the services provided or arranged by the
Company in respect with the handling of cargo including loading and discharging,
transport, lashing/unlashing, slinging/unslinging, storage, stuffing and stripping of
containers and any other related or connected cargo, handling activities.
(f) "Cargo Booking Services" means those services provided or arranged by the
Company in respect with the, booking, of cargo on vessels including providing
information on vessels and schedules, the. solicitation. of cargo, the canvassing for
cargoes, freight quotations and negotiations as to. any cargo transport agreements with
Merchants and any other related activities.
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Transactions with the Supplier
The following terms and conditions shall apply to transactions with the Supplier:
2. Unless otherwise stated in writing, when the Company is acting as a port agent or liner
agent or booking agent it acts at all times as agent for and on behalf of the Principal and
has authority to enter into contracts with the Supplier as agent for the Principal. The
Company shall not be personally liable to pay any debt due to the Supplier from the
Principal.
3. Where the Company is acting as a forwarding agent, cargo handling agent or cargo
booking agent, unless it is acting as agent for the Principal in accordance with clause 2
hereof or otherwise agrees in writing, it acts at all times as agent for and on behalf of the
Merchant and has authority to enter into contracts with the Supplier as agent for the
Merchant. The Company shall not be personally liable to pay any debt due from the
Merchant.
Transactions with the Merchant
The following terms and conditions shall apply to transactions with the Merchant:
4. When acting as port agent or liner agent or cargo handling, agent or cargo booking
agent, the Company acts at all times as agent for and on behalf of the Principal and has
authority to enter into contracts with the Merchant as agent for the Principal. The
Company shall not be personally liable to pay any debt due from the Principal.
5. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, where-to, Company is instructed by the Merchant
to arrange forwarding services, cargo handling services or cargo booking services, the
Company shall act as agent for the Merchant in procuring the requested services from
Supplier.
6. Where the Company arranges services for the Merchant's goods which are or will be
carried in accordance with a contract with the Principal contained in or evidenced by a
bill of lading, charter party or other contract of affreightment, all services including cargo
handling services or cargo booking services, forwarding services, are arranged by the
Company as agent for and on behalf of the Principal. The provision of such services shall
be subject to the terms and conditions of the Principal's bill of lading and tariff rules (if
any), which may be inspected on request, or, other contract, between the Principal and the
Merchant.
7. If the Company agrees in writing that it ill be personally responsible for the provision
of forwarding services, cargo handling services or cargo booking services, unless
otherwise agreed in writing, the Company shah be relieved of any liability for loss or
damage if it can establish that such loss or damage resulted from:
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(a) the act or omission of the Merchant or his representative or any other party from
whom the Company took charge of the goods;
(b) inherent vice of the goods, including improper packing, labeling or addressing
(except to the extent that the Company undertook to be responsible therefor);
(c) handling, loading, stowage or unloading of the goods by the Merchant or any
person acting on his behalf other than the Company;
(d) seizure or forfeiture under legal process;
(e) riot, civil commotion, strike, lock-out, general or partial stoppage or restraint
of labour from whatever cause;
(f) any consequence or war, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether
war be declared or not), civil war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection, military or usurped
power or confiscation or nationalisation or requisition or destruction of or damage to any
property or goods by or under the order of any Government or public or local authority;
(g) any cause or event which the Company was unable to avoid and the
consequences whereof the Company was unable to prevent by the exercise of due
diligence.
8. Where so requested in writing by the Merchant or his representative, the Company
shall enter and/or clear goods through Customs and/or arrange insurance for the goods as
agent for the Merchant. The Company shall have authority to appoint agents to perform
such services on behalf of the Merchant, and the agents so appointed shall act as the
Merchant's agents and not the Company's agents.
9. Where the Company agrees to provide or arrange services for the Merchant's goods,
the Merchant shall be deemed to have authorised the Company to conclude all and any
contracts necessary to provide those services. The Merchant shall reimburse on demand
the Company with all taxes, charges or fines whatsoever incurred by the Company as a
result of providing or arranging the services, of undertaking any liability in connection
with the services, particularly in respect of any bond issued to the Department of Customs
and Excise, the Cyprus Ports Authority or any other competent Authority by the
Company.
10. The Merchant shall declare to the Company full details of goods, which are of a
dangerous or damaging nature, including those goods, which are more particularly
described in the IMO Code. Should the Merchant fail to provide such details at the time
of contract, the Merchant shall be responsible for all costs and damages arising as a result
thereof and the Company shall have the right exercisable on behalf of itself or its
Principal to rescind the contract. ,
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11. The Company shall not be liable for loss or damage to goods, unless it is advised
thereof in writing within three days after the termination of transit and the claim is made
in writing within 7 days, alternatively advice is given within 28 days of the
commencement of transit and the claim is made in writing within 42 days, provided
always that these limits shall not apply if the Merchant can establish that it was not
reasonably possible for him to make a claim in writing within the time limit and notice
was given within a reasonable time.
Transactions with the Principal:
The following terms and conditions shall apply to transactions with the Principal:
12. The Company shall be the principal's agent and shall exercise due care and diligence
in performing services for and on behalf of the Principal.
13. The Principal shall indemnify the Company in respect of all liabilities incurred by
the Company where acting as a port agent or liner agent or booking agent or cargo
handling agent or cargo booking agent on the Principal's behalf.
14. The Principal shall pay forthwith by telegraphic transfer to the Company's bank
account such sum as the Company may request as an advance on port and cargo handling
disbursements which the Company estimate will be incurred whilst the Principal's vessel
is in the Company's agency. If the Principal should fail to comply with the Company's
request, the Company may at any time give notice of the termination of its agency.
15. The Company shall be entitled to deduct from sums held by the Company for the
Principal's account any amounts due to the Company from the principal.
16. The liability of the Company to its Principal in respect of any negligent act error or
omission committed by the Company its directors, or employees shall not exceed the
amount of the fees or commission payable by the Principal to the Company in respect of
the vessel or shipment involved (whichever is less) which. fees or commission shall be
deemed earned in any event. Provided always that where the Agent acts prudently all
damages sustained by or to the ships gear including containers shall be for the account of
the Principal.
17. The Company shall not be liable to indemnify the Principal in respect of any
contractual fine, penalty or forfeit incurred by the Principal,
18. Subject to any written instructions to the contrary the Company shall have authority
to appoint agents to perform services on behalf of the Principal, including such services
as may be the subject of these conditions, and the agents so appointed shall act as the
principal's agents and not the Company's agents.
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19. Save where otherwise specifically provided herein the provisions to be found in the
FONASBA Standard Liner Agency Agreement (as applicable from time to time) shall
apply as between the Company and the Principal.
Liability and Limitations
20. The Company shall perform its duties with a reasonable degree of care, diligence,
skill and judgment.
21. The Company shall be relieved of liability for any loss or damage if and to the extent
that such loss or damage is caused by:
(a) Strike, lock-out, stoppage or restraint of labour, the consequences of which the
Company is unable to avoid by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
(b) Any cause or event which the Company is unable to avoid and the
consequences whereof the Company is, unable to prevent by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.
22. Unless otherwise agreed in writing and in each instance with a maximum of
CY£30.000, the liability of the Company to the Merchant shall in all circumstances be
limited to the lesser of sums calculated in the following manner:
(a) where goods are lost or damaged:
(i) the value of goods lost and damaged,
(ii) a sum calculated at the rate of CYE400 per tonne of the gross weight of any
goods lost or damaged.
(b) in all other circumstances:
(i) the value of the goods the subject of, the relevant transaction between the
Company and the Merchant or
(ii) a sum calculated at the rate of CYf400, per tonne of the gross 'weight of the
goods the subject of the transaction. ;
23. For cargo handling and/or stevedoring services the Company in no event shall be
liable for an amount in excess of that to which the shipping line/shipowner is able to limit
its liability to the shipper or consignee under the terms to the Bill of Lading or to a sum
of CYf400 per tonne of the gross weight of the goods whichever shall be the least.
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General
24. If the Merchant or the Principal, as the case may be, fails to make payment in full of any
sums due to the Company on demand or within any period agreed in writing, the Company shall
be entitled to recover interest on any sums outstanding at the rate of 9% or such higher or other
rate that may from time to time be prescribed by the laws of Cyprus.
25. The Company shall have a general lien on all goods and documents relating to goods in its
possession, custody or control for all sums due at any time from the Principal or the Merchant
and/or their representatives and shall be entitled to sell or dispose of such goods or documents as
agent for and at the expense of the Principal or the Merchant and apply the proceeds towards the
monies due and the expenses or the retention insurance and sale of the goods, the Company shall,
upon accounting to the Principal or the Merchant for any balance remaining, be discharged from
all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods.
26. The Company shall be entitled to retain and be paid all brokerages, commission, allowances
and other remuneration, usually retained by or paid to freight forwarders including cargo
handling charges.
27. The Merchant, the Supplier and the Principal each undertake with the Company that no claim
or allegation of any kind shall be made against any of the Company's directors officers or
employees (herein collectively called "the Beneficiaries") for any loss damage or delay of
whatsoever kind arising or resulting directly or, indirectly from any negligent act error or
omission of the Beneficiaries in the performance of the services the subject of these conditions.
The Beneficiaries shall have the benefit of this undertaking and in entering into this contract the
Company, to the extent of this provision, does so not only on its own behalf but also as agent or
trustee for the Beneficiaries, who shall to the extent of this clause only be or be deemed to be
parties to this contract.
28. The Company shall perform the services it undertakes to provide with due dispatch but shall
not be liable for any loss or damage arising from any delay which it could not reasonably prevent.
29. The Company shall be discharged from all liability whatsoever to the Principal the
Supplier or the Merchant unless suit is brought within one year of delivery of the goods or the
date when they should have been delivered or of the act or default complained of, whichever is
the earlier.
30. These conditions shall be subject to Cyprus Law.
31. If there is any conflict between the terms set out herein and any other terms and conditions
agreed between the parties these Conditions shall prevail unless the Company specifically agrees
otherwise in writing.
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32. The Principal and/or Merchant undertake to comply with the provisions of the
International Convention for Safe Container (CSG) 1972 relating to the safety of
containers. Any damage caused (including bodily harm) by the non-compliance with the
said Convention shall render the Company harmless of any, responsibility despite any
involvement of the Company. With regard to containers the Customs Convention of
Container 1972 shall apply under these conditions.
33. A Principal or Merchant shall pay to the Company for the services rendered by the
Company all amounts as may have been agreed between them by virtue of any
agreement concluded, the amounts arising out of the charges as per the official tariffs
approved from time to time by the Cyprus Ports Authority as well as all those charges
normally or habitually charged by the company for services such as notification fees, bill
of lading fees, service fees etc at the rates recommended or otherwise suggested by he
C.S.A. In the event of a particular service not being provided for in the scale of charges
the Principal or Merchant shall pay the Company a reasonable charge for such service.
FEBRUARY, 1998
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